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MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE AND THE
DAMNATION OF THE HEATHEN:
A RESPONSE TO WILLIAM CRAIG
William Hasker

William Craig has proposed the view that all those persons who are in fact
lost suffer from "transworld damnation"-the property of being such that, in
every world actualizable by God in which one exists, one "freely does not
respond to God's grace and so is lost." I show that Craig's proposal implies
a conclusion he cannot possibly accept-namely, that no one is ever saved
as a result of the preaching of the Gospel who would not have been saved
otherwise.

In a recent article, I William Craig has provided a solution for what he calls
the "soteriological problem of evil," the problem of why it is, given the
goodness and love of God, that many persons, and in particular almost all of
those who have never heard the Gospel, are eternally damned. 2 I believe this
attempted solution must be characterized as courageous: Craig is well aware
that, even among other orthodox Christians,3 not many will welcome his
resolution of the problem. I propose to show, however, that the proposal is
fatally flawed, that Craig's solution resolves the problem only given an additional assumption which Craig cannot possibly accept.
Craig begins with what might be termed a Free Will Defense against the
soteriological problem of evil. Modeled closely on Plantinga's Free Will
Defense, Craig's objective is to show that
1.

God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent

is logically consistent with
2.

Some persons do not receive Christ and are damned.

The method, as with Plantinga, is to adduce a third proposition which is
consistent with (1) and which, when conjoined with (1), entails (2). Craig's
candidate for this third proposition is
9.

God has actualized a world containing an optimal balance between saved
and unsaved, and those who are unsaved suffer from transworld damnation.

"Transworld damnation" is a property modeled on Plantinga' s "transworld
depravity," which is the property of being such that, in every world God could
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have actualized (every "feasible" world 4 ) in which one exists, one freely
performs a morally wrong action on at least one occasion. Similarly, transworld damnation is the property of being such that in every feasible world
in which one exists one "freely does not respond to God's grace and so is
lost. "5
Is Craig's defense successful? Note that, as it stands, (9) does not entail
(2), either singly or in conjunction with (1). For all (9) says, the "optimal
balance" could be one in which all free creatures in need of salvation are in
fact saved; the final quantification in (9) could be vacuous. What we need,
then, is
9'.

God has actualized a world containing an optimal balance between saved
and unsaved in which not all are saved, and those who are unsaved suffer
from transworld damnation.

Clearly, (9') entails (2), but is it consistent with (1)? It seems likely that it is. It
seems plausible (indeed, I believe it to be true) that a loving God might prefer
a world in which some creatures freely accept salvation while others freely reject
it, to a world in which neither of these occurs. And I see no way to rule out as
logically impossible the supposition that the "balance between saved and unsaved" in the actual world is optimal. And the final clause, which was introduced
to avoid the complaint that the lost are treated unjustly by being placed in
circumstances under which they would reject salvation, also seems to be logically
possible. 6 So far, then, Craig's defense appears to succeed.
But Craig aspires to more than this; he says:
I find the above account of the matter to be quite plausible not only as a
defense, but also as a soteriological theodicy. Indeed, I think that it helps to
put the proper perspective on Christian missions: it is our duty to proclaim
the gospel to the whole world, trusting that God has so providentially ordered
things that through us the good news will be brought to persons who God
knew would respond if they heard it. 7

Craig holds, in other words, that (9) gives a true account of God's reasons
for actualizing a world in which many are lost.
Now this move from defense to theodicy creates a number of difficulties.
There is, for one thing, the question of why anyone would suppose (9') to be
true. Craig himself says nothing in its favor except that it helps to resolve
certain theological difficulties. And some of the implications of (9') may well
give us pause. 8 But rather than pursue these matters, let us examine a pair of
cases showing the application of (9'). Consider Pastor Paul, a veteran missionary approaching the end of a life of faithful service. He has devoted
himself in ministry to a group of previously unevangelized tribesmen, with
generally gratifying results. There have been a number of baptisms, and there
are several small but vigorous village churches as a result of his mission. But
one regret clouds Paul's reflections. On two occasions he passed up oppor-
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tunities to cross the nearby mountain range and preach to another tribe which
has still not been reached with the Gospel. At the time there seemed to be
good practical reasons for passing up these opportunities, but now he wonders
whether simple fear for his own life may not have been the true motive. And
he is deeply troubled lest he bear responsibility for the fate of the souls which
may have been lost in consequence of his failure.
Fortunately, it is just at this juncture that the mail arrives, and included in
it is Pastor Paul's copy of the April, 1989, Faith and Philosophy. He immediately sees the relevance of William Craig's article to his perplexity, and
soon, his dogeared copy of The Nature of Necessity by his side for easy
reference, he is deeply enmeshed in the complexities of counterfactuallogic.
The question he has in mind, let us remember, is
(A) Are there persons to whom I failed to preach who are going to be lost,
and who would have been saved had I gone to them with the Gospel?

After a thoughtful perusal of Craig's article, it becomes apparent to Pastor
Paul that in all probability the answer is No. For from (9') we learn that those
among the unreached tribe who will be lost suffer from transworld damnation, meaning that in no circumstances in God's power to actualize would
those persons have accepted God's offer of salvation. Even if, for example,
God were to take Billy Graham, Mother Teresa, Pope John Paul II, or all three
together, send them to the unreached tribe with an exhaustive knowledge of
its language and customs, and leave them there as long as you please, it would
be unavailing. And if on those occasions when Pastor Paul declined the
opportunity to go to them, God had made his will so clear that Paul would
have gone in spite of his fears, that also would have resulted in no conversions. 9 Paul shakes his head sadly at the tragic obduracy of the unsaved.
Clearly, though, it is not his fault.
At this point another shadow crosses Paul's mind. It seems that, even if he
had gone to the unreached tribe, little or no good would have resulted. But
has he really accomplished much through the course he has in fact taken?
Now Paul's question is
(B) Are there persons who have been saved as a result of my preaching, who
would not have been saved had they never heard the Gospel?

A little reflection, however, encourages him with the realization that in all
likelihood the answer to (B) is Yes. As we have seen, there have in fact been
a good number of conversions through Paul's preaching, and the likelihood
that any of these persons would have been saved without hearing the Gospel,
through their response to general revelation, is extremely small.lO There is
no reason to doubt that, in the vast majority of instances, those who respond
to the Gospel in faith are saved specifically because they have been evangelized and would not have been saved otherwise. As Craig says (and Pastor
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Paul makes these words his own): "My compassion towards those in
other ... religions is ... expressed ... by my ... making every effort myself to communicate to them the life-giving message of salvation through Christ."!!
Pastor Paul, then, seems to have reached a stable resting point in his reflections. On the one hand, he can be thankful to God for the fruitfulness of
his mission, resulting in the conversion of many who would otherwise have
been lost. On the other hand, he need not torment himself over his possible
failure to be still more aggressive in his evangelistic efforts, for those whom
he might have reached are victims of transworld damnation and almost certainly would not have responded to the Gospel in any case. To be sure, some
of us may experience discomfort at the thought that Pastor Paul could similarly console himself no matter what his actual record of service might have
been, no matter how badly he might have failed in the responsibility assigned
to him. But let us trouble Pastor Paul no more; he deserves his rest.
Consider now Parson Peter. Peter is the minister of a thriving congregation
which, to all appearances, is responding very favorably to his efforts. Yet he
wonders, as many others have before him, whether his gifts might not be
better employed in taking the Gospel to those who have never heard. His
parishioners and their townsmen have had many, many opportunities to hear
the Gospel, in contrast to the unevangelized masses of the world. Yet, he
wonders, would he really make a difference by going? He is asking himself,
in other words,
(C) If I were to go to the mission field and preach to those who otherwise
would never hear the Gospel,!2 are there persons who would be saved
as a result of my preaching, who would otherwise be lost?

Fortunately, Peter also is a subscriber to Faith and Philosophy, and soon he,
too, is immersed in William Craig's article. And with this help he quickly
arrives at an affirmative answer to his question (C). Very few of the heathen,
he realizes, would ever find God apart from the preaching of the Gospel, and
as he anticipates his mission he draws deep inspiration from Craig's dictum
that "it is our duty to proclaim the gospel to the whole world, trusting that
God has so providentially ordered things that through us the good news will
be brought to persons who God knew would respond if they heard it."!3
In order to check his answer, however, Parson Peter now decides to put the
question another way: he asks, not about the consequences if he goes to the
mission field, but about the consequences if he remains where he is. His
question, then, is
(D) If I were to fail to go to the mission field, are there persons to whom I
would in consequence not preach who would then be lost, and who
would have been saved had I gone to them with the Gospel?

But now his thinking takes a surprising twist. For, following the same rea-
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soning used by Paul to answer (A), Peter concludes that in all likelihood there
is no one who would be saved as a result of his preaching who would not be
saved otherwise. Any who are lost would, by (9'), be sufferers from transworld damnation-and as we have already seen, it is unlikely in the extreme
that anything Peter might do would soften the heart of such a one.
And now Peter finds himself in a state of deep perplexity. He redoubles his
concentration and checks his answers to both (C) and (D) several times over.
But always he reaches the same answers: to (C), the answer is "in all probability Yes," while to (D) the answer is, "in all probability No." And yet,
Peter reflects, (C) and (D) are to all intents and purposes the same question;
they both ask concerning that group of persons who would be saved if Peter
goes to preach to them and would be lost otherwise. And his reasoning
concerning (C) seems to show clearly that there are likely to be many such
persons, while his reasoning about (D) indicates there are probably none at
all. Finally Peter's copy of Faith and Philosophy slips through his dispirited
fingers and falls to the floor. After some time, Peter picks up his pen and
begins to write steadily: he will appeal to Pastor Paul for advice.
At this point we take leave of these two servants of the Lord, with good
hope that between them they will find a solution to Peter's spiritual dilemma.
We, on the other hand, need to address the logical aspects of the problemwhat we may term Peter's Paradox. A first observation is that the paradox
fails to appear in Paul's retrospective reflections; it is only when Peter applies
Craig's position prospectively, looking forward to his own future mission,
that it becomes apparent. And the reason for this is that in Paul's case we
were dealing with two different groups of people, one of which (the unreached
tribe) suffered from transworld damnation, while the other (Paul's converts)
did not. In Peter's case, on the other hand, it is the same individuals who (it
seems) both are and are not damned transworldly.
Nevertheless, we have here only a paradox and not a contradiction. For we
do not have the result that these persons both do and do not suffer from
transworld damnation. What we have arrived at, rather, is that they would
suffer from it if the Gospel were never preached to them, whereas they would
not so suffer if the Gospel were preached to them. We have, in other words,
the following proposition:
10. There exists some person such that (a) Peter will freely choose whether
or not to preach the Gospel to this person, and (b) if Peter were to preach
the Gospel to her, it would be the case that, if Peter were to preach to
her, she would freely accept salvation, whereas (c) if Peter were not to
preach the Gospel to her, she would suffer from transworld damnation
and it would not be the case that, if Peter to preach to her, she would
freely accept salvation.

It is evident that (10) is extremely probable, given Craig's position, even
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though it is not strictly entailed by it. Clearly, if the answer to (C) is Yes and
to (D) No, then (10) follows. But the correct answer to (D) is "in all probability No,"14 and the correct answer to (C) is "in all probability Yes";ls these
answers, taken together, do not entail (10) but they do suffice to render (10)
extremely probable. And so we come to the following important question:
Can (10) be true? If it cannot, then Craig's position, though perhaps not
formally inconsistent, is surely untenable. 16
It seems that (10) cannot possibly be true. It is clear that (10) amounts to
saying that the transworld damnation of the persons in question, and therefore
the counterfactuals of freedom true of these persons, depend on Peter's actions. But how could this be true? One possibility which may occur to us is,
that if God knew that Peter would not take the Gospel to the unevangelized
tribe, he would see to it that the members of that tribe suffer from transworld
damnation, but if he knew that Peter would go to them, he would insure that
they are not afflicted with trans world damnation. But it is an absolutely
essential feature of the theory of middle knowledge that the counterfactuals
of freedom are not under God's control. Nor is there any other intelligible
way in which the tribesmen's counterfactuals could depend on Peter's action.
I think it is reasonable to conclude that (10) is necessarily false, and Craig's
position is indeed untenable. 17
Indeed, it is possible to show formally that (10) involves a contradiction.
If we let "P" = the proposition that Peter preaches to the person in question,
and "A" = the proposition that she accepts salvation, the two counterfactuals
in (10) can be symbolized as follows:
i. P [}> (P [}> A)
ii. -P [}>- (P [}>A)

Now (a) says that Peter will freely choose whether or not to preach to her, and
if this is so it must be possible that he will choose not to do so. In order to test
this possibility, we add the assumption that Peter does not preach to her:
iii. - P

Now we can derive:
iv. -(P [}> A) (from ii, iii)
v. (P [}> A) (equivalent to i)

vi. (P [}>A) & -(P [}>A) (from iv, v)

We see, then, that adding "-P" as an assumption generates a contradiction.
It follows that either Peter's not preaching is not a genuine possibility, which
contradicts clause (a) from (10), or else one of the two counterfactuals,
formulating clauses (b) and (c), must be false. We may conclude, then, that
(10) is indeed self-contradictory, and Craig's position is untenable.
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How then do we account for the paradox? Is (9') inconsistent with (1) after
all? I don't think so; the reasons given above for their consistency still strike
me as correct. The difficulty arises, rather, from another assumption, independent of (9'), which Craig introduces into his discussion-an assumption
which may be formulated as follows:
11. Most of those who accept the Gospel and are saved would not have been
saved had the Gospel not been preached to them. 18

It is this assumption which enables Paul to give an affirmative answer to
(B), and which also supports Peter's affirmative answer to (C), which,
together with the negative answer to (D), generates Peter's Paradox. In
order to eliminate the paradox, (11) must be rejected.
Indeed, Craig's statements suggest that he is committed to a proposition
which is considerably stronger than the denial of (11). Consider, once
again, those persons who, in fact, accept the Gospel and so are saved.
Would those persons have been saved if they had never heard the Gospel?
It follows from (9') that they would have been saved under those conditions, unless they would suffer from transworld damnation. In the actual
world, of course, they do not suffer from it, but it is possible that these
persons, who are in fact saved, would have suffered from transworld damnation if no one had preached the Gospel to them? I have already suggested that there is no intelligible basis, in the theory of middle
knowledge, for the suggestion that the counterfactuals of freedom true of
a person depend on the actions of some other human being. But now there
is another point which must be added to that one: To assume that these
persons would be damned transworldly if no one preached the Gospel to
them undercuts the very reason for the introduction of trans world damnation. That reason, it will be recalled, was to deprive the unevangelized
heathen of grounds for complaint: there is no injustice in their never
having heard the Gospel because, as God knew, even if they had been
evangelized they would have rejected Christ. But it now turns out that the
property of transworld damnation is itself the product of the failure of
evangelism! It is clear that this assumption conflicts with Craig's position
and must be rejected by him.
It seems clear, then, that we must reject the suggestion that those who are
in fact saved would be damned transworldly if they had never heard the
Gospel. But in that case, it follows from (9') that
12. All those who accept the Gospel and are saved would have been saved
even if the Gospel had never been preached to them.

This avoids the paradox, but it is evident that Craig could not accept it,
concerned as he is with the urgency of the task of world evangelism. Indeed,
it is hard to see how any orthodox Christian could accept (12). But if we
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accept (9'), it is inescapable that (12) must be true and (11) false. In view of
this, the prospects for (9') as a "soteriological theodicy" are dim indeed.
Craig's defense (as opposed to theodicy) for the soteriological problem of
evil remains, in a sense, unaffected by this. That is to say, it remains true that
(9') is consistent with (1) and entails (2), thus showing that (1) and (2) are
consistent. But in view of what we now know, this is likely to strike us as a
Pyrrhic victory. For what we have shown is that the price of (9') is the
acceptance of (12) and the rejection of (11). But the claim of (11) to be part
of orthodox Christianity is just about as strong as that of (2), and I would
think there are in fact rather few Christians who affirm (2) and reject (11).
If however we add (11) to the triad consisting of 0), (2), and (9'), the
resulting set of propositions is inconsistent. 19 The task of showing the consistency of (1), (2), and (11) still remains. 20
Huntington College

NOTES
1. "'No Other Name': A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation
Through Christ," Faith and Philosophy, vol. 6 (1989), pp. 172-88.
2. Craig allows that some who have never heard the Gospel might be saved through
their response to the light of general revelation, but he believes that this would be true of
at most a very small proportion of such persons (ibid., p. 176).
3. Craig might prefer to say, "otherwise orthodox Christians."
4. The central idea of the Free Will Defense is that there are some logically possible
worlds which God could not actualize, because the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom
are such that, if placed in the appropriate choice situations, one or more free creatures
would not respond in the way they would need to respond for those particular worlds to
become actual.

5. Ibid., p. 184.
6. Of course, (9') is logically possible only if there are true counterfactuals of freedom
and middle knowledge is possible. These assumptions will not be contested here, although
I believe them to be false.
7. Ibid., p. 186.
8. For one thing, we may be perplexed by the apparent geographical and racial bias in
the incidence of transworld damnation. On Craig's account, transworld damnation must
have affected very nearly the entire human race, aside from Jews, at the time of Christ;
since then its incidence has gradually decreased'as the Gospel has been spread throughout
the world. It would be interesting, to say the least, to know Craig's explanation for this
phenomenon.
9. We must be careful here. We might be inclined to think that it follows immediately
from (9') that, had Paul on those past occasions freely decided to go to the unreached tribe,
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there would have been no conversions. But since Paul in fact freely chose on those
occasions not to go, it follows that Paul's counterfactuals are such that the world in which,
under exactly those same conditions, Paul decides to go is not a feasible world. And
because of this, it does not follow logically from the transworld damnation of the tribesmen
that they would reject salvation in that world; transworld damnation tells us only what
happens to its victims in feasible worlds. (That is why the answer to (A) is, "in all
probability, No," and not "No" simpliciter.) But the practical importance of this point is
slight, since we know that even under circumstances which are considerably more favorable than those which obtain in that particular world (viz., those in which they were
evangelized by some combination of Billy Graham, Mother Teresa, and the Pope), these
tribesmen still would have rejected salvation.
This point can perhaps be made more persuasive by treating it in a general way. What
I claim is this: If a person suffers from transworld damnation, and so would reject salvation
in all feasible worlds, then it is most unlikely that this person would accept salvation in
any of the unfeasible worlds which are fairly close to the actual world with respect to what
happens in that person's life. For the feasible worlds presumably include some which are
extremely favorable with respect to the person's opportunities to find salvation-favorable
with respect both to the "means of grace" (i.e., the forceful and appealing presentation of
the Gospel, the witness of the lives of Christian persons, miraculous demonstrations of
divine power, and so on) and with respect to the direct influence of the Holy Spirit in the
life of that person. And if the person would still reject God under those circumstances,
then that person is most unlikely to accept salvation in any of the unfeasible worlds where
the person's life goes much as it does in the actual world.
10. "If we take Scripture seriously, we must admit that the vast majority of persons in
the world are condemned and will be forever lost, even if in some relatively rare cases a
person might be saved through his response to the light that he has apart from special
revelation" (Craig, p. 176, emphasis added).
11. Ibid., p. 186-87.
12. Peter here makes the assumption that there are persons to whom he might preach
who otherwise would never hear the Gospel at all. We, also, will make this assumption,
and will carry it throughout the subsequent reasoning. Clearly, in the vast history of
missionary endeavor there must have been many missionaries and evangelists concerning
whom such an assumption would be correct, even though it may be difficult to be
absolutely certain of it in a particular case such as Peter's.
13. Ibid., p. 186. Note that, unlike Paul's case, there is another way in which the answer
to (C) could tum out to be No: It is conceivable that no one will be converted in response
to Peter's preaching. This however is unlikely, given that God has so ordered things that
"through us the good news will be brought to persons who God knew would respond if
they heard it." Peter applies this to himself, and rightly so-yet it by no means provides
an absolute guarantee. I do not think Craig's dictum rules out the possibility that, in a few
instances, God for his own good reasons might send his servants to spend their lives
witnessing in situations where there is no one who will respond in faith. But, these cases,
if they exist, must be quite rare, and there is no reason to expect that Peter's mission will
be like this.
14. See the reasoning in Note 9 above.
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15. See the reasoning in Note 13 above.
16. Note that there will be analogues of (10) concerning very many other persons who
have faced decisions similar to Peter's; even if, contrary to the probabilities, (10) itself
should turn out to be false, the probability that all propositions of this type would be false
is vanishingly small.
17. No adherent of middle knowledge, so far as I know, has ever suggested that the
truth of counterfactuals of freedom concerning a person depends on the actions of some
other human being. Plantinga has suggested that these counterfactuals, in some cases,
depend on the agent herself, I have argued against this in "A Refutation of Middle
Knowledge" (NoUs, vol. 20 (1986), pp. 545-57).
18. That this is Craig's position is clear from the reasons given above in support of an
affirmative answer to Paul's question (B).
19. This claim of inconsistency depends on the point, argued in the previous two
paragraphs, that those who are in fact saved would not suffer from trans world damnation
in consequence of never having been evangelized.
20. I do not mean to imply that I think these three propositions really are inconsistent.
The bad apple in the barrel, in my opinion, is (9'), and in particular the notion of trans world
damnation. In this case, it is the solution which is the problem.

